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CRIMINAL LAW
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COUNSEL
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT SUCCESSIVE PCR APPLICATION
In Aice v. State' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
ineffective counsel in a post-conviction relief (PCR) hearing is not per se
"sufficient reason" to support a successive PCR application.' The Aice
court emphasized the need for finality in the judicial process,3 and the
decision reflects the supreme court's reluctance to allow successive PCR
applications. 4
Michael Aice received two consecutive life sentences after he was
convicted of two murders that occurred in a drive-by shooting on July 5,
1980. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on
direct appeal in 1982, and the United States Supreme Court denied
Aice's petition for certiorari. Subsequently, in 1985 the circuit court
denied Aice's first PCR application, so Aice petitioned the South
Carolina Supreme Court for certiorari to review the decision of the PCR
judge. Aice raised three grounds for relief not raised in the original PCR
hearing; however, the court denied his certiorari petition in 1986.1
Next, Aice attempted to obtain habeas corpus relief in federal court,
but was also unsuccessful. Aice then filed a second application for PCR,
raising the same three grounds for relief that he asserted in his certiorari
petition to the South Carolina Supreme Court. He argued that, because
of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, those three issues were not
presented at the first PCR hearing. The PCR court dismissed Aice's
second application as impermissibly successive.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Aice's petition for
certiorari to review the PCR court's dismissal of Aice's second PCR
application.7 Aice argued before the supreme court that the PCR court
should not have dismissed his second PCR application because he had
three meritorious arguments that showed his conviction was fundamental-
1. 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392 (1991).
2. Id. at 451, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
3. Id.
4. See id. at 450-51, 409 S.E.2d at 394 (citing Carter v. State, 293 S.C. 528,
362 S.E.2d 20 (1987); Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980)).
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ly unfair, and because his first PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise these arguments.'
The court held that Aice's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
did not constitute "sufficient reason" for relief as required under section
17-27-90 of the South Carolina Code.9 The court noted that the phrase
"sufficient reason" has been interpreted very narrowly in South
Carolina.'0 Accordingly, the court held that, because Aice's counsel
could have raised the three arguments in the first PCR hearing, Aice
could not raise those grounds in a successive PCR application.1 The
court specifically refused to examine why Aice did not raise the new
grounds; the court stated "it is sufficient that they could have been
raised, but were not. "12 An applicant faces a difficult burden in
establishing a "sufficient reason" for raising an argument in a second
PCR application that was not raised at the original PCR hearing. 3
8. Id. The court initially disagreed that Aice's additional arguments had any
merit; however, the court did not reach the merits because the court dismissed Aice's
successive PCR application on procedural grounds. Id.
9. Id. at 449-50, 409 S.E.2d at 393-94. Section 17-27-90 provides:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must
be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any
ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure
relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court
finds a ground for relief asserted -which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or
amended application.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added), quoted in Aice,
305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 393-94.
10. Aice, 305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394 ("'Under Section 8 of the [Post-
Conviction Relief] Act, successive applications for relief are not to be entertained,
and the burden shall be on the applicant to establish that any new ground raised in
a subsequent application could not have been raised by him in the previous
application.'") (alteration in original) (quoting S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 50(3)). The South
Carolina Supreme Court Rules were replaced by the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules, which became effective on September 1, 1990. S.C. APP. CT. R. 102.
11. Aice, 305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 450-51, 409 S.E.2d at 394. The Aice court distinguished Case v.
State, 277 S.C. 474, 289 S.E.2d 413 (1982), in which a successive application for
PCR relief was granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. Aice,
305 S.C. at 451 & n.1, 409 S.E.2d at 394 & n.1. The petitioner in Case was without
an attorney in his first PCR application; therefore, it was doubtful whether the
petitioner "could have" raised his arguments in a PCR hearing. Id.
1992]
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The court's decision in Aice rested ultimately on public policy. The
court stated: "Finality must be realized at some point in order to achieve
a semblance of effectiveness in dispensing justice. At some juncture
judicial review must stop, with only the very rarest of exceptions...
"14 If the court allowed convicted defendants to raise arguments not
raised at a prior PCR hearing, successive PCR applications would be
limited only by the creativity and ingenuity of a sldlled attorney. 15
In Pennsylvania v. Finley16 the United States Supreme Court held
that an indigent petitioner does not have a constitutional right to court-
appointed counsel in a state PCR proceeding.' 7 Therefore, any rights a
convict may assert in PCR proceedings must come from state law."a In
Carter v. State'9 the South Carolina Supreme Court set forth the test
governing successive PCR applications for claims of ineffective counsel:
Generally, successive applications for post-conviction relief are
viewed with disfavor and the applicant has the burden of showing
that a new ground for relief could not have been raised in a previous
application. If the applicant meets this burden, a hearing must be
afforded despite the successiveness of the application.'3
Interestingly, the Aice court did not address whether the petitioner's
PCR counsel was in fact ineffective. 2 The court focused instead on
14. Aice, 305 S.C. at 451, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
15. Id.
16. 481 U.S. 551 (1987), cited in Aice, 305 S.C. at 452 n.2, 409 S.E.2d at 395
n.2.
17. Id. at 556-57.
18. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("If the
applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of representation . . . these
expenses shall be made available to the applicant in the trial court, and on review.
• . ."). Furthermore, former South Carolina Supreme Court Rule 50(5) provided:
"After return is made by the State, if the application presents questions of law or
issues of fact requiring a hearing, the court shall appoint counsel promptly to assist
the applicant if he is an indigent person." S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 50(5), repealed by S.C.
App. CT. R. 102.
19. 293 S.C. 528, 362 S.E.2d 20 (1987).
20. Id. at 530, 362 S.E.2d at 21 (citations omitted).
21. The briefs of this case indicate that Aice's trial counsel was not ineffective;
therefore, Aice's PCR counsel would have had reasons not to argue the three
additional grounds in the first PCR hearing. For example, petitioner states in his brief
that his PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the failure of his trial counsel
to cross-examine adequately the state's major witness. Aice claimed that the witness's
in-court identification of him was tainted by the witness's inadequate out-of-court
lineup identification. The lineup identification was faulty because petitioner was the
[Vol. 44
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whether petitioner's counsel could have raised the additional claims in the
first application. The court concluded that "[c]learly, the arguments Aice
seeks to advance in his second PCR could have been raised in his first
application."' Accordingly, the court did not look beyond the proce-
dural aspects of Aice's claim.3 Unfortunately, this approach provides
little guidance for practitioners or convicted defendants.
The Aice court held that ineffective assistance of counsel is not per
se "sufficient reason" to support a successive application for a PCR
hearing if the petitioner could have raised the same claims in the first
hearing.24 However, it remains unclear whether the court would stand
by its rationale in a case in which prior PCR counsel was truly ineffec-
tive. The broad language of the opinion suggests that a successive PCR
application will be denied even if counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise claims that could have been raised.'
Brent M. Boyd
II. TRIAL JUDGES MUST RECUSE THEMSELVES IN
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARINGS
In Floyd v. State26 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a per
se rule that, upon motion, a judge must recuse himself in a post-
conviction relief (PCR) hearing if he presided over the defendant's case
at trial.27 The court overruled Henry v. State,28 which permitted judges
only person placed in the lineup whom the witness did not know. Brief of Appellant
at 15-16. However, as the State argued, by cross-examining the witness on the lineup
identification, Aice's counsel would have given the jury yet another identification of
Aice as the perpetrator of the murders. Brief of Respondent at 18-19. The State
argued that this .vai a proper "tactical" decision because petitioner's counsel was
caught in a "catch-22." Id. at 19. This tactical decision likely is not ineffective
assistance of counsel because it arguably meets the test of "reasonableness" under
prevailing "professional norms." See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. Aice, 305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 451, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
25. If Aice's counsel were actually ineffective in failing to raise those claims in
the first application, it is doubtful whether Aice "could have raised" the claims. The
Aice court apparently suggests that as long as petitioner had counsel and the
additional arguments were available, a successive application for relief will be denied
regardless of whether the decision to assert the claims failed to meet the standard of
effective representation.
26. 303 S.C. 298, 400 S.E.2d 145 (1991) (per curiam).
27. Id. at 299, 400 S.E.2d at 146.
1992]
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to preside at both proceedings unless the Code of Judicial Conduct
required disqualification.29 Floyd is significant because the trial judge's
actions are often the subject of review in a PCR hearing. After Floyd,
convicted defendants successfully can move to have a new and impartial
judge review their PCR applications.
The petitioner, Darrel Floyd, was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison. Thereafter, Floyd unsuccessfully pursued both
a direct appeal based on an erroneous jury instruction and an application
for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Floyd then filed a motion for further PCR hearings.3° Instead of ruling
on the motion, the supreme court instructed the parties to brief the issue
of whether Henry v. State3 should be overruled or modified.3" The
Floyd court based its decision on the briefs submitted, but provided no
analytical framework for its holding.33
The defendant raised two arguments in opposition to Henry. Floyd
first argued that allowing the same judge to preside at both his trial and
PCR hearing violated his right to an impartial collateral review.34
Because the trial judge failed to recuse himself in the collateral proceed-
ings, he destroyed Floyd's only chance to show the violation of his right
to the effective assistance of counsel.35 When, as in Floyd, failure to
object to a judge's error constitutes counsel's allegedly deficient
28. 275 S.C. 148, 268 S.E.2d 41 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Floyd, 303
S.C. 298, 400 S.E.2d 145.
29. Floyd, 303 S.C. at 299, 400 S.E.2d at 146. Under South Carolina's version
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." S.C. APP. CT. R. 501,
Canon 3(C)(1).
30. Brief of Appellant at 3-5. Judge Rodney A. Peeples presided at Floyd's trial.
Judge Peeples also reviewed and denied Floyd's motion for further PCR hearings.
31. 275 S.C. 148, 268 S.E.2d 41 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Floyd, 303
S.C. 298, 400 S.E.2d 145.
32. Floyd, 303 S.C. at 299, 400 S.E.2d at 145.
33. See id. at 299, 400 S.E.2d at 146.
34. Brief of Appellant at 6.
35. Id. The appellant's argument is based in part on general due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, §
3 of the South Carolina Constitution, and on the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must show
that his counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance
resulted in such prejudice that he was deprived of a fair trial. Butler v. State, 286
S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094 (1986).
[Vol. 44
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performance, it is questionable whether the same judge can objectively
review the prejudice resulting from his or her own mistake.36
In his second argument, Floyd contended that Henry was ineffective
in actual practice.3" The Code of Judicial Conduct calls for a judge's
disqualification both when the judge actually is not impartial, and when
one might reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality.3" In Henry the
court adopted the provisions of this Code section, but provided no
specific guidelines for the section's application in a PCR hearing.39 In
response to Floyd's arguments, the supreme court articulated its per se
rule and remanded the case for new PCR proceedings. 4'
The Floyd decision provides increased protection for convicted
defendants seeking post-conviction relief. The supreme court's failure in
Henry to set disqualification guidelines in addition to those in the Code
of Judicial Conduct left lower courts free to interpret and apply the
language of Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code to these situations. Admittedly,
no South Carolina court had ever addressed the issue of disqualification
on facts analogous to those in Floyd. However, the Fourth Circuit
provides some guidance through its interpretations of the federal judicial
disqualification statute.4" Additionally, several states have enacted
legislation that directs the choice of judge in PCR proceedings.
42
36. See Brief of Appellant at 6.
37. See id. at 7.
38. S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 3(C)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988)
("Any .. .judge . ..shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114,
1116 (4th Cir. 1978) (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)).
39. Brief of Appellant at 7 (discussing Henry v. State, 275 S.C. 148, 268
S.E.2d 41 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 400
S.E.2d 145 (1991) (per curiam)).
40. Floyd, 303 S.C. at 299, 400 S.E.2d at 146.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). In interpreting this statute, the Fourth Circuit
has adopted an objective partiality standard "to foster not only actual impartiality but
also the appearance of impartiality." United States v. Carmichael, 726 F.2d 158, 160
(4th Cir. 1984) (holding that, in a proceeding to review an erroneous jury instruction,
a reviewing judge who also gave the jury instruction creates reasonable appearance
of partiality); see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,
859 (1988) (holding that scienter is not an element of § 455(a), because it does not
"eliminate the risk" that other persons may question a judge's impartiality).
Additionally, any alleged bias must be personal and must not have developed as a
result of the proceedings in question. See Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Carmichael, 726 F.2d at 158.
42. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-4907(a) (1987) (requiring that any judge of the
court in which the conviction took place hear the application); TENN. CODE ANN. §
40-30-103(b)(1) & (2) (1990) (requiring that the trial judge hear a post-conviction
1992]
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Until the Floyd decision, South Carolina courts allowed an apparent-
ly partial procedure.43 Floyd's per se rule eliminates the likelihood of
a partial reviewing judge. Nevertheless, Floyd's per se recusal require-
ment may sometimes result in uncertainty. For example, it is unclear
who should hear the PCR application if no other presiding judges are
available in a particular circuit. Additionally, it is uncertain whether the
trial judge must recuse himself in every case. If the trial court's decision
is based on a point of law rather than evidence, or if the defendant does
not allege judicial error, disqualifying a trial judge who is familiar with
the facts and the record would serve no purpose. Requiring another judge
to spend a great deal of time learning about a case would not be
practical, especially when the applicant has made a bad-faith motion.
petition if the applicant raises a competency of counsel issue).
Under the Iowa statute, the same judge who presided at trial usually hears the
PCR application. See Freeman v. State, 757 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
Judges have discretion to grant or deny the motion based upon whether they feel they
actually have become biased. See IDAHO R. Civ. P. 40(d)(2)(B); Sivak v. State, 731
P.2d 192, 201 (Idaho 1986). This requirement of actual bias is contrary to the Code
of Judicial Conduct, S.C. APP. CT. R. 501, Canon 3(C)(1), and to Floyd, both of
which seek to avoid even an appearance of partiality. Floyd, 303 S.C. 298, 400
S.E.2d 145.
Under the Tennessee statute, if an applicant does not raise an issue about the
competency of counsel, the same judge should not preside at the PCR hearing. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-30-103(b)(2) (1990). The Tennessee legislature's apparent
motivation in not allowing the same judge to preside was to guarantee an impartial
judge. See Brown v. State, No. 01-C-01-9010-CR00254, 1991 WL 94575, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 1991); cf. Wimley v. State, No. 87-33-rn, 1987 WL
17011, at *1, *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1987). Wimley presented a factual
situation remarkably similar to Floyd. In Wimley the defendant's counsel did not
object to the judge's erroneous malice instruction at trial, and the trial judge denied
the application for post-conviction relief. Wimley appealed, attacking the statute
requiring the same judge to preside when ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged.
Avoiding the question, the court found that no prejudice occurred because the
erroneous charge was now before the court in the appeal from PCR proceedings. Id.
at *5.
43. South Carolina's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-27-10 to -120 (Law. Co-op. 1976), fails to specify whether the trial judge
should preside at the post-conviction relief hearings. See id. § 17-27-80; Buchanan
v. State, 276 S.C. 127, 276 S.E.2d 302 (1981). The Act merely requires that the
relief application "be heard in, and before any judge of, a court of competent
jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction took place." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-
27-80; Buchanan, 276 S.C. at 129, 276 S.E.2d at 303 (holding that this language
only requires that the post-conviction application be heard before a judge who has
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Although the Floyd court concluded that a per se recusal rule would
be better than its holding in Henry,' strict guidelines do not always allow
for the many factual differences that may arise. For example, having the
trial judge preside at a PCR proceeding may benefit the defendant
because the trial judge is familiar with the record and with any alleged
ineffectiveness of counsel." However, because only a defendant's motion
activates the per se rule in Floyd, defendants may choose whether they
want new judges to hear their PCR applications. Defendants should not
only have unbiased judges, but also should believe in their judges'
impartiality. 46
As a result of Floyd, judges must recuse themselves upon motion in
a PCR hearing if they presided at the proceeding from which the
applicant seeks relief. Floyd requires that South Carolina courts recognize
the constitutional purpose of collateral relief proceedings - the preserva-
tion of an individual's right to due process of law.
M. Catherin Cauthen
III. SOUTH CAROLINA EXTENDS TO PROBATIONERS FULL SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Huckaby v. State 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
a defendant at a probation revocation hearing has a right to counsel co-
extensive with that of an accused at trial.4 ' The Huckaby court applied
and extended Faretta v. California49 and Gagnon v. Scarpellis° and
concluded that the petitioner had not made a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel."'
44. Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 299, 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (per
curiam).
45. See Commonwealth v. Rashed, 436 A.2d 134, 138 (Pa. 1981).
46. See Floyd, 303 S.C. at 299,400 S.E.2d at 146; Adams v. State, 376 N.E.2d
482, 483 (Ind. 1978).
47: 305 S.C. 331, 408 S.E.2d 242 (1991).
48. Id. at 335, 408 S.E.2d at 244.
49. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that, although a defendant in a state
criminal trial has a constitutional right to self-representation, the defendant must
"knowingly and intelligently" waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
50. 411 U.S. 778 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in Baldwin v. Benson,
584 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1978).
51. Huckaby, 305 S.C. at 336, 408 S.E.2d at 245. The Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
1992]
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David Lee Huckaby was convicted of distributing cocaine and
sentenced to fifteen years suspended upon the payment of a $2000 fine
and the completion of five years of intensive probation. Under the
conditions of his probation, Huckaby had to attend drug rehabilitation
counseling and report weekly to a probation officer. Huckaby's failure
to comply with these requirements led to the probation revocation
proceeding at issue. 2
On July 21, 1988, Huckaby appeared at a probation revocation
proceeding. He had been charged with missing four weekly visits to his
probation officer in one month, failing to pay his supervision fee, and
failing to attend the required drug rehabilitation counseling. On the
morning of the hearing, Huckaby met with his probation officer and
explained that he had missed the weekly meetings because his previous
probation officer told him that he was being reclassified from intensive
to regular probation and would only be required to report once a month.
Huckaby also explained that he had been unable to afford the drug
counseling. The new probation officer arranged for Huckaby to attend
counseling and pay on an extended payment plan.53 Huckaby apparently
felt that he had adequately explained his transgressions and that the
subsequent hearing would be, as had the previous two, "a rote procedur-
al requirement" at which "the judge would simply hear explanations from
Mr. Huckaby and reports from the parole officers, and then continue his
probation."54
The same judge who initially sentenced Huckaby conducted the
probation revocation hearing. The judge recognized Huckaby and asked
Huckaby whether he had a lawyer. When Huckaby said that he did not,
the judge asked if Huckaby understood that he had the right to have
counsel present, and Huckaby responded affirmatively. Finally, the judge
asked Huckaby if he wanted to waive his right to counsel and proceed
with the hearing, and Huckaby again responded affirmatively. The judge
explained the charges against Huckaby and asked if he had anything to
say in his defense. Before Huckaby was able to respond, the judge cut
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52. Huckaby, 305 S.C. at 332, 408 S.E.2d at 243. Huckaby had appeared at
probation revocation hearings on two prior occasions. At the first hearing, Huckaby
was represented by counsel, and the judge continued the probation upon testimony
from Huckaby's probation officer explaining the alleged failures to comply with the
probationary requirements. At the second hearing, Huckaby stated that he could not
afford counsel, but the judge determined that Huckaby did not qualify for public
representation. Again, the judge simply heard the explanation of the probation officer
and continued the probation. Id. at 332-33, 408 S.E.2d at 243.
53. Id. at 333, 408 S.E.2d at 243.
54. Id. at 333, 408 S.E.2d at 243-44.
[Vol. 44
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him off and revoked his probation. The judge commented that the media
had been critical of his practice of giving suspended sentences in drug
cases.' Huckaby appealed the revocation of his probation on the ground
that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The circuit
court denied relief, and Huckaby petitioned the South Carolina Supreme
Court for certiorari. The supreme court reversed and remanded for a new
hearing.
5 6
In Barlet v. State57 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that all
persons facing a parole revocation hearing must be advised of their right
to counsel and that some indigent persons may have the right to court-
.appointed counsel.58 The Barlet court based its holding in part on the
United States Supreme Court case of Gagnon v. Scarpelli.59 In Scarpelli
the Court examined whether a probationer had a right to counsel at a
probation revocation hearing. The Court noted that, although such a
hearing was not a criminal proceeding, the possible loss of liberty
warranted due process protection.' However, the Court failed to extend
the full right to counsel to all probationers, but opted to allow a case-by-
case determination.61 The Barlet court went beyond the confines of
Scarpelli by ordering that all persons be advised of their right to counsel
in all revocation hearings.62
In Huckaby the court expanded the protection offered in Barlet.
Now, courts must not only advise probationers of the right to counsel,
but also determine whether probationers have validly waived that
right.63 In fact, the Huckaby court stated that a probationer "retains his
55. Id. at 334, 408 S.E.2d at 244.
56. Id. at 336, 408 S.E.2d at 245.
57. 288 S.C. 481, 343 S.E.2d 620 (1986).
58. Id. at 482-83, 343 S.E.2d at 621 (citing S.C. Sup. Ct. R. 51(B)(2) & (3)).
59. 411 U.S. 778 (1973), superseded by statute as stated in Baldwin v. Benson,
584 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1978).
60. Id. at 781.
61. See id. at 790. The Court acknowledged that the case-by-case analysis
originally had been adopted to govern the right to counsel in other areas. In Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court adopted a case-by-case approach for the right
to counsel in felony prosecutions. The Court later rejected that approach in favor of
a per se approach in the landmark civil rights case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963). See Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 788. The Court did not agree, however,
that the rejection of the case-by-case approach for trial purposes was a condemnation
of the approach itself. Id.
62. Barlet, 288 S.C. at 482-83, 343 S.E.2d at 621-22 (applying S.C. Sup. Ct.
R. 51(B)(2) (stating that every person charged with a violation of probation must be
advised of his right to counsel)).
63. Huckaby v. State, 305 S.C. 331, 335, 408 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1992).
1992]
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full Sixth Amendment right to counsel. "I This is a significant departure
from the Scarpelli holding.
The Huckaby court's extension of full Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to probationers gives probationers the same waiver standards
afforded to criminal defendants at trial. First, the record must demon-
strate that the court conducted a hearing to determine whether a party
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.6 Secondly, the
record must demonstrate not only that the defendant understood the risks
of self-representation, but also that the defendant was "'made aware of
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that . . .he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open. ' "66
Applying the newly announced standard to the facts of this case, the
Huckaby court found that the State had not given the defendant an
adequate Bateman hearing;67 accordingly, the court remanded for a new
hearing.
68
In Huckaby, South Carolina joined other states that have gone
beyond the protection mandated by the United States Supreme Court in
Scarpelli.69 As other courts have noted, the additional protection of a
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. State v. Bateman, 296 S.C. 367, 369, 373 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1988) (citing
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)), and limited by State v. Cash, 304 S.C.
233, 403 S.E.2d 632 (1991).
66. Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293, 294, 391 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1990) (quoting
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).
67. Mr. Huckaby answered only three questions, each with a short "yes sir" or
"no sir" answer, before the court proceeded with the hearing. Huckaby, 305 S.C.
334, 408 S.E.2d at 244. The supreme court noted that "[t]he record certainly does
not reflect the level of understanding and awareness of the severity of the risks and
dangers of this situation which is required by Wroten." Id. at 336,408 S.E.2d at 245.
68. Interestingly, in remanding for a new probation hearing, the supreme court
failed to follow a case it decided only four months before Huckaby. See State v.
Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 403 S.E.2d 632 (1991) (holding that absent extraordinary
circumstances, the proper remedy when the record fails to reflect a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver is to remand to determine whether the waiver was actually
"knowing and intelligent"). Although Huckaby might fall within Cash's extraordinary
circumstances exception, it is disturbing that the court failed to address the possible
relevance of its recent precedent.
69. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985) (abandoning the
case-by-case analysis of Scarpelli and granting full right to counsel for all probation-
ers because "a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily
understood and easier to administer"); State v. Coltrane, 299 S.E.2d 199, 201-02
(N.C. 1983) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345(e) (1978) to reject the rule
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uniform rule is easier to administer than a case-by-case analysis. The rule
in Huckaby will be more convenient for attorneys as well as judges,
while affording more protection to probationers.
F. Scott Pfeiffer
IV. SUPREME COURT REMANDS CASE FOR HEARING TO REVIEW
WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In State v. Cash70 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an
appellate court should remand a criminal case in which the defendant
appeared pro se if the record does not reflect a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 7' On remand, the trial
court must determine whether the defendant in fact made such a waiver
of the right to counsel.72 The Cash decision revives the court's previous
holding in State v. Dixon73 and departs from the recent practice of
automatically granting a new trial.74
In Cash the defendant, who appeared at trial pro se, was convicted
of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. 75 Before the trial, the judge
questioned the defendant about his reasons for wanting to proceed pro
se.7 6 The defendant replied that the public defender was too busy to try
a case like his.77 The judge informed the defendant of the right to
counsel and of the possible sentence of the charge, 7 but the judge failed
to warn the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-represen-
tation.
70. 304 S.C. 223, 403 S.E.2d 632 (1991) (per curiam).
71. Id. at 225, 403 S.E.2d at 634. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. Cash, 304 S.C. at 225, 403 S.E.2d at 634.
73. 269 S.C. 107, 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977). In Dixon, the court remanded a
criminal case to the lower court for a factual determination of whether the defendant,
who had proceeded pro se, actually made an "intelligent and competent waiver" of
his right to counsel. Id. at 109, 236 S.E.2d at 420-21.
74. See, e.g., State v. Coto, 296 S.C. 480, 374 S.E.2d 181 (1988) (per curiam);
State v. Bateman, 296 S.C. 367, 373 S.E.2d 470 (1988).
75. Cash, 304 S.C. at 224, 403 S.E.2d at 633.
76. Record at 2-3, 6. The judge also inquired about the defendant's age and
educational background. The defendant was a forty-six year old man with six years
of college education obtained while in prison. Id. at 2, 7.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id. at 3.
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At trial, the judge again asked the defendant whether he wished to
represent himself, and again the defendant responded affirmatively.79
During the trial the judge expressed his disapproval of pro se litigants,80
but at one point the judge actually complimented the defendant's
performance.8" Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted.
On appeal, the supreme court offered little justification for departing
from Bateman' and Coto.83 The court merely noted that a Dixon
hearing8' had been standard practice for more than ten years and that
its holding in Cash was in accordance with this established practice.85
The court distinguished Bateman and Coto because of the "unusual facts"
of those cases.86 The Cash court explained that, in cases such as
79. Id. at 8.
80. For example, during the defendant's examination of the complainant, the
judge instructed the defendant to ask questions rather than to testify, noting that
'you're testifying again. Another reason why I prefer people to get lawyers." Id. at
23-25; see also id. at 85 (Judge related to defendant: "But I hate to tell you what they
taught me in law school about a man representing himself, about what kind of client
he's got.").
81. Id. at 85. However, during the trial, the defendant failed to make objections
that were available to him. See id. at 55-56. The defendant could have objected to
the judge's comment about the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Ates, 297
S.C. 316, 377 S.E.2d 98 (1989) (per curiam).
82. State v. Bateman, 296 S.C. 367, 373 S.E.2d 470 (1988). Bateman is
discussed infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
83. State v. Coto, 296 S.C. 480, 374 S.E.2d 181 (1988) (per curiam). Coto is
discussed infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
84. A trial court holds a Dixon hearing to determine whether a prose defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. State v. Dixon, 269 S.C.
107, 109, 236 S.E.2d 419, 420-21 (1977). At this hearing, both the prosecution and
the defense may present evidence and examine witnesses. Id. at 109, 236 S.E.2d at
421.
85. State v. Cash, 304 S.C. 223, 224-25, 403 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991) (per
curiam).
86. Id. at 225, 403 S.E.2d at 634. In Coto the defendant, without representation
by counsel, pleaded guilty to murder after killing his wife in an apparent crime of
passion. The El Salvadoran defendant had lived in the United States for only three
years and had no previous experience with the criminal justice system. Record at 2,
8, Coto, 296 S.C. 480, 374 S.E.2d 181 (No. 87-790). The judge did not inform the
defendant of the nature of the charge of murder, nor did the judge inform the
defendant of the potential sentence of the charge until sentencing. Brief of Appellant
at 15. The case's undisputed facts revealed that the use of counsel probably would
have resulted in a much more favorable sentence for the defendant. Id. at 17-18.
Under these egregious circumstances, a Dixon hearing would be a waste of time.
Bateman also presented an exceptional situation. The defendants in Bateman
were tried for trafficking in marijuana and for conspiring to traffic in marijuana. Two
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Bateman and Coto, "it would be almost impossible to find a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel even if a Dixon hearing were
ordered."' Therefore, the interest of judicial economy mandated the
different result.8
Cash clears the waters that Bateman and Coto muddied. The Cash
court explained that Bateman and Coto were exceptions to the general
procedural rule articulated in Dixon. 9 However, an examination of
those cases fails to clarify the justification for these exceptions because
the supreme court remanded both cases with little explanation beyond the
conclusory statement that the records did not demonstrate "knowing and
intelligent" waivers.' ° The court's minimal analysis in Bateman and
Coto may have caused both practitioners and defendants to assume that
a new trial was automatically the remedy when the record does not
reflect a knowing or intelligent waiver. Cash invalidates this assumption.
The court's underlying motivation behind Cash and Dixon is judicial
economy. A defendant who waives the right to counsel "'with [his] eyes
open'"9 1 can no longer waste the state's time and money on a new trial
simply because the trial judge failed to determine whether the defendant's
eyes were indeed open.' The state also saves time and money when the
Coto exception applies. If the appellate record clearly reflects an
of the six defendants served as "spokesmen" for the group, in effect representing
themselves and the other four defendants throughout the trial. According to the
appellate record, the judge questioned only these two of the six defendants. State v.
Bateman, 296 S.C. 367, 368-69, 373 S.E.2d 470, 470-71 (1988). The scope of the
judge's questions was limited to the defendants' religion and family background, and
the ownership interest in the land on which the marijuana was found. The judge
addressed the other four defendants only for identification purposes. Id. The court
held that the record clearly indicated that the judge's inquiry of the pro se defendants
fell "far short of the standards for a knowing and intelligent waiver." Id. at 369, 373
S.E.2d at 471.
87. Cash, 304 S.C. at 225,-403 S.E.2d at 634.
88. See id.
89. Id. The Dixon hearing is discussed supra notes 73 and 84.
90. See Coto, 296 S.C. at 481, 374 S.E.2d at 181-82; Bateman, 296 S.C. at
369, 373 S.E.2d at 471. In neither Coto nor Bateman did the court discuss the
necessity of a Dixon hearing. See also Prince v. State, 301 S.C. 422, 392 S.E.2d 462
(1990) (remanding for new trial because PCR judge erred in finding a valid waiver
of right to counsel when defendant pleaded guilty); Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293,
391 S.E.2d 575 (1990) (same).
91. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
92. The trial judge's inquiries are relevant in determining whether a pro se
defendant's waiver of counsel is "knowing and intelligent," but the defendant's
understanding is dispositive. See, e.g., Wroten, 301 S.C. at 294, 391 S.E.2d at 576
(citing Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057, 1065 (1lth Cir. 1986)).
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unknowing or unintelligent waiver, automatically granting a new trial is
both fair and expedient because a Dixon hearing would not further
justice. Unfortunately, it remains unclear exactly when the Coto
exception applies. 3
Absent exceptional circumstances, the preferred remedy when the
appellate record fails to reflect a criminal defendant's knowing and
intelligent waiver of counsel is to remand for a Dixon hearing rather than
automatically to grant a new trial. The Cash holding clarifies the law,
promotes judicial economy, and preserves the rights of the accused.
Pamela A. Wilkins
V. PRIOR UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANOR NOT RESULTING IN
IMPRISONMENT MAY BE USED FOR PENALTY ENHANCEMENT
In State v. Chance94 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, which
did not result in incarceration, may be used to increase the sentence for
a second conviction under an enhanced penalty statute.95 Although
Chance represents the supreme court's first interpretation of Baldasar v.
Illinois,9 6 the court followed the lead of several other jurisdictions by
interpreting Baldasar narrowly. 97
Chance was convicted of his second offense for driving under the
influence (DUI) and was sentenced to one year in prison.9 The trial
court used Chance's uncounseled DUI conviction from 1980 to enhance
his punishment under the state's DUI recidivist statute.99 On appeal,
93. One possible application of the exception is the case of a pro se defendant
who pleads. guilty. The defendants in Coto, Prince, and Wroten pleaded guilty.
Because a pro se defendant who pleads guilty receives no trial, the record may be so
sparse and the defendant may have had so little contact with the judicial system that
a knowing or intelligent waiver would have been impossible.
94. 304 S.C. 406,405 S.E.2d 375 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1241 (1992).
95. Id. at 408, 405 S.E.2d at 376.
96. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam). The Baldasar Court, in a plurality
decision, reversed a state court ruling that allowed the use of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction to convert a subsequent misdemeanor conviction into a
felony conviction with a prison term. Id. at 223-24. Baldasar is discussed infra notes
106-10 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
98. Chance, 304 S.C. at 406, 405 S.E.2d at 375.
99. Id. The South Carolina DUI recidivist statute is codified at S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 56-5-2940 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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Chance argued that Baldasar precludes penalty enhancement unless the
state can show that the defendant affirmatively waived his right to
counsel in the prior uncounseled conviction.' ° However, the supreme
court rejected Chance's argument and affirmed the trial court's use of the
prior uncounseled conviction for penalty enhancement purposes.'0 '
In Chance the supreme court stated that, although Baldasar
"grappled" with the enhanced penalty statute issue, the Court never
resolved the matter." The Chance court noted several inconsistent
state court interpretations of Baldasar,°3 but without further discus-
sion, the court declared that "an uncounselled conviction constitutionally
valid under Scott is valid for all purposes and therefore may be used to
increase the term of imprisonment for a subsequent offense under an
enhanced penalty statute."1 The court strengthened its adherence to
the Scott rationale by holding that "when a defendant was not actually
incarcerated for a prior uncounselled misdemeanor, that offense may be
used for enhancement."0 5
In Baldasar the United States Supreme Court reversed a defendant's
felony conviction and prison sentence after the trial court allowed
evidence of the defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
to be used for penalty enhancement." In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, reasoned that an
enhanced prison sentence violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
if the defendant was uncounseled in his first conviction."°  In the
second concurrence Justice Marshall agreed,' but found that the first
conviction was invalid for all purposes, including "the purpose of
100. Chance, 304 S.C. at 407, 405 S.E.2d at 375.
101. See id. at 407-08, 405 S.E.2d at 376.
102. Id. at 407, 405 S.E.2d at 375.
103. Id. at 4.07, 405 S.E.2d at 376 (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d
57 (Pa. 1986); State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364 (Wis. 1982); Sargent v. Common-
wealth, 360 S.E.2d 895 (Va. Ct. App. 1987); and State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171
(N.D. 1985)).
104. Id. at 407-08, 405 S.E.2d at 376. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979),
the Court held that an uncounseled conviction is constitutional if the offender is not
imprisoned. Scott, 440 U.S. at 369. Actual imprisonment is the defining standard.
Id. at 373.
105. Chance, 304 S.C. at 408, 405 S.E.2d at 376.
106. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam). The penalty
enhancement statute in Baldasar permitted a second misdemeanor conviction to be
treated as a felony conviction with a prison term of one to three years. Id. at 223.
107. See id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. 367).
108. Id. at 224-29 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Stevens also
joined in this concurrence. Id. at 224.
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depriving [the] petitioner of his liberty.""9 Justice Blackmun wrote the
third concurring opinion in which he reiterated his "bright line" approach
that the Court declined to adopt in Scott. 110
The Court's failure to agree on a clear holding"' has produced
conflicting interpretations of Baldasar."' Because of this uncertainty,
109. Id. at 226 (citing Scott, 440 U.S. 367, and Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972) (holding that no imprisonment may be imposed unless the accused is
represented by counsel)). Justice Marshall reasoned that Baldasar's subsequent
sentence was a direct result of his first conviction because, absent that prior
uncounseled conviction, Baldasar's maximum sentence for his second conviction
would have been one year. Id. at 226-27. Marshall concluded that the state deprived
Baldasar of "'the guiding hand of counsel'" in the previous conviction. Id. at 227
(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). Therefore, Marshall found
that Baldasar was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that the
increased prison sentence was constitutionally invalid for all purposes. See id. at 227-
29.
110. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his Scott dissent, Justice
Blackmun noted that the state must provide counsel for any indigent defendant who
is prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment or is
actually subjected to imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Therefore, becauseBaldasar'suncounseled conviction was
punishable by more than six months imprisonment, that conviction was invalid and
could not be used to enhance his sentence in a subsequent conviction. See Baldasar,
446 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1990)
(discussing the inconsistencies of the three concurring opinions in Bqldasar).
112. See, e.g., Black v. Florida, 935 F.2d 206 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(relying on Moore v. Jarvis, 885 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1989)) (concluding that
Baldasar applies only to situations involving indigent defendants or state misconduct);
Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983) (limiting Baldasar
to the precise factual context in which it arose), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1986) (holding prior uncounseled guilty
plea valid for enhancement if no actual imprisonment and not subject to imprisonment
for more than six months); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 895 (Va. Ct. App.
1987) (holding prior uncounseled convictions invalid for enhancement even if no
actual imprisonment). See generally David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of
UncounseledMisdemeanor Convictions After Scott andBaldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV.
517 (1982).
In the federal courts the United States Sentencing Guidelines have added to this
confusion by authorizing sentencing courts to count prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions when determining criminal history points. UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 comment. (backg'd) at 271 (Nov. 1991)
("Prior sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to be counted in the criminal history
score, including uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was not
imposed."). However, some courts have noted the potential constitutional problem
of whether the use of uncounseled convictions violates the Sixth Amendment right'to
counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 499 (2d Cir. 1991);
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many courts have construed Baldasar narrowly."' Furthermore, some
courts apparently have applied Justice Blackmun's "bright line" standard
and have held that only "uncounseled misdemeanor conviction[s]
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment cannot... be used
to increase a prison term under an enhanced penalty provision."1
4
The South Carolina Supreme Court could have affirmed Chance by
distinguishing Justice Blackmun's pivotal concurring opinion in Balda-
sar. " s However, the court decided to affirm Chance by narrowly
interpreting Baldasar instead of distinguishing it. Unfortunately, the court
gave no interpretive guidance before announcing its holding." 6
The Chance decision allows South Carolina courts to use a criminal
defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance a
subsequent sentence if the prior conviction is constitutionally valid under
Scott." 7 However, the court's interpretation of Baldasar more closely
parallels the Scott majority opinion". and the Baldasar dissent" 9 than
United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (mem.).
113. See, e.g., Black, 935 F.2d 206; Schindler, 715 F.2d 341; State v. Orr, 375
N.W.2d 171, 176 (N.D. 1985) (claiming to interpret Baldasar on its narrowest
grounds); Thomas, 507 A.2d 57.
114. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 176.
115. In his Baldasar concurrence, Justice Blackmun reasoned that Baldasar's first
misdemeanor conviction violated the "bright line" standard because Baldasar could
have been sentenced to up to one year in prison. "Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun concluded that Baldasar's first
conviction could not be used for penalty enhancement in a subsequent conviction
because of this invalidity. Id. However, the uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in
Chance carried a maximum sentence of only thirty days. State v. Chance, 304 S.C.
406, 407 n.1, 405 S.E.2d 375, 375 n.1 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1241 (1992).
Unlike Baldasar, the potential sentence in Chance does not violate Blackmun's
"bright line" test. Therefore, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Baldasar would not
have precluded the use of Chance's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for
penalty enhancement.
116. See Chance, 304 S.C. 406, 405 S.E.2d 376 (holding that an uncounseled
conviction is valid for all purposes, including penalty enhancement, provided that the
conviction is constitutionally valid under Scott).
117. Id. at 407-08, 405 S.E.2d at 375-76 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979)).
118. The Scott Court determined that actual imprisonment defines the constitu-
tional right to appointment of counsel. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (relying on Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
119. In his Baldasar dissent, Justice Powell argued that the concurring Justices
misunderstood the nature of enhancement statutes. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232
(Powell, J., dissenting). Powell reasoned that these statutes do not alter or enhance
a prior sentence, but are imposed solely as a penalty for the second crime. Id.
Consequently, "an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is constitutionally valid [for
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Baldasar's concurring opinions. This similarity to the Baldasar dissent
weakens Chance's persuasiveness, but until the Supreme Court clarifies
its position on this issue, courts must interpret and apply Baldasar with
only an unclear plurality opinion as a guide.12
0
Christie L. Companion
VI. DEFINITION OF REASONABLE DOUBT IN JURY CHARGE HELD
CONSTITUTIONALLY INSUFFICIENT
In State v. Manning12 1 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
a capital murder conviction by holding that the trial judge's charge on
reasonable doubt violated the defendant's due process rights.'2 The
court noted that the jury charge was so confusing that a reasonable juror
could have interpreted the charge as allowing a standard of proof of less
than reasonable doubt." The Manning court recognized the difficulty
of defining "reasonable doubt" to a jury and suggested that trial judges
use the limited definition of reasonable doubt approved by the United
States Supreme Court in Holland v. United States.24
Warren Douglas Manning was convicted and sentenced to death for
the murder of George Radford, a South Carolina State Trooper. On
appeal, the supreme court addressed the constitutionality of the judge's
jury charge on the reasonable doubt standard."u The court evaluated
purposes of penalty enhancement] if the offender is not jailed." Id. at 230.
120. The Supreme Court repeatedly has declined opportunities to clarify
Baldasar. See, e.g., Moore v. Georgia, 484 U.S. 904, denying cert. to 352 S.E.2d
821 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984),
denying cert. to 715 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
121. 305 S.C. 413,409 S.E.2d 372(1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282(1992).
122. Id. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 375.
123. Id.
124. 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (holding that a reasonable doubt is the "kind of
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act").
125. The trial judge's charge on reasonable doubt provided, in pertinent part:
Beyond a reasonable doubt, ... the degree of proof by which the State
must prove .... means exactly what it states in the English language, and
that is a doubt for which you can give a real reason. That excludes a
whimsical doubt, fanciful doubt. You could doubt any proposition if you
wanted to. A reasonable doubt is a substantial doubt for which honest
people, such as you, when searching for the truth can give a real reason.
So it's to that degree of proof that the State is required to establish the
elements of a charge.
[Vol. 44
19
Boyd et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
CRIMINAL LAW
Manning's appeal in light of the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Cage v. Louisiana.26
In Cage the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. The trial judge's charge "equated a reasonable doubt
with a 'grave uncertainty' and an 'actual substantial doubt,' and stated
that... 'moral certainty"' was required to find the defendant guilty. 7
The Court evaluated the charge as a whole and held that, when reason-
able doubt is "considered with the reference to 'moral certainty,' rather
than evidentiary certainty," a reasonable juror could interpret the
instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a standard below that of
reasonable doubt. 28 Accordingly, the Cage Court concluded that the
jury charge violated the defendant's right to due process. 9
Similarly, the trial judge in Manning used the phrase "moral
certainty" in his charge. 30 The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the use of this phrase violates the Due Process Clause'.' if other
terms of the charge suggest a doubt greater than that "'required for
•.. I would instruct you to seek some reasonable explanation of the
circumstances proven other than the guilt of the Defendant and if such
reasonable explanation can be found you would find the Defendant not
guilty ....
Sometimes during a charge, and I might have used it, the phrase
moral certainty might be used. There is no different degree of proof
required. Moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt are the same
thing in the eyes of the law. It might be a different way of stating the
same proposition. Either of those two phrases, moral certainty, beyond a
reasonable doubt, connote a degree of proof which is distinguished from
an absolute certainty.
Record at 1080, 1086-87 (emphasis added). The Manning court quoted substantially
all of the above ilpstructions, but the order of the instructions quoted in the opinion
is not the same as that in the record. See Manning, 305 S.C. at 415-16, 409 S.E.2d
at 374.
126. 111 S. Ct. 328 (1990) (per curiam), discussed in Manning, 305 S.C. at416,
409 S.E.2d at 374.
127. Id. at 329.
128. Id. at 330. The Court also recognized that the federal courts have xFidely
criticized attempts to define reasonable doubt. Id. at 330 n.* (citing Taylor v.
Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978); Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 889-90 (10th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 720-21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980);
United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 1965)).
129. Id. at 330.
130. See supra note 125.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard.'"132 Although the court
noted that "the trial judge twice defined reasonable doubt as 'a doubt for
which you can give a real reason,'"' m the court focused primarily on
the trial judge's circumstantial evidence charge.'
This charge regarding circumstantial evidence violated the test
established in State v. Littlejohn 3 5 that a jury must use to evaluate
circumstantial evidence.' 36 The Manning court stated that the jury
charge could have misled "a reasonable juror to focus exclusively on.
[the defendant's] explanation of the evidence to determine the
existence of reasonable doubt" instead of on whether the State proved
every material element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt. "'37 This possibility that a reasonable juror "could have" inter-
preted the charge as allowing a finding of guilt based on a degree of
132. Manning, 305 S.C. at 416, 409 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Cage, 111 S. Ct. at
329-30).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 416-17, 409 S.E.2d at 374-75. The trial judge gave the following
charge on reasonable doubt: "When you are giving your attention to circumstantial
evidence, I would instruct you to seek some reasonable explanation of the circum-
stances proven other than the guilt of the Defendant and if such reasonable
explanation can be found you would find the Defendant not guilty." Record at 1086.
135. 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955).
136. See id. at 328, 89 S.E.2d at 926 (holding that the jury must determine "that
every circumstance relied upon by the state [is] proven beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that all of the circumstances so proven be consistent with each other and, taken
together, point conclusively to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other
reasonable hypothesis"); accord State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 275, 379 S.E.2d
888, 889, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895 (1989).
137. Manning, 305 S.C. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 375. The Manning court again
noted that the trial judge's charge equated a reasonable doubt with "a doubt for which
you can 'give a real reason,'" but continued to focus on the trial judge's circumstan-
tial evidence charge. Id. at 416, 409 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Record at 1080).
However, the trial judge's charge also included the following:
To the extent that the State relies on circumstantial evidence to prove any
aspect of its case, the State must prove all the circumstances relied on and
must prove them beyond a reasonable doubt ....
Those circumstances must be wholly and in every particular consistent
with each other and they must point conclusively to the guilt of the
accused to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis.
Record at 1085-86. Although this portion of the charge probably comports with the
test enunciated in Littlejohn, see supra note 136, the supreme court reversed
Manning's conviction because of the deficiency of the trial judge's charge as a whole.
Manning, 305 S.C. at 416-17, 409 S.E.2d at 374-75.
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proof below the reasonable doubt standard 3' violated Manning's right
to due process.139
The Manning court concluded by stating that reasonable doubt is
"best understood when the jury is simply instructed to give it its plain
and ordinary meaning. "" The supreme court cautiously suggested that
trial judges define reasonable doubt as "'the kind of doubt that would
cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.' '141
J. Emmette Pilgreen, IV
VII. COURT ABOLISHES IN FAVOREM VITAE AND FORBIDS TRIAL
JUDGES FROM INSTRUCTING CAPITAL JURIES ABOUT
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY
In State v. Torrence'42 the South Carolina Supreme Court abol-
ished the two-century-old doctrine of in favorem vitae" review of
capital cases and adopted a contemporaneous objection rule.'" The
court also overruled State v. Atkins, 45 which allowed judges to charge
138. More recently, the Supreme Court chose to evaluate jury charges under a
"reasonable likelihood" test rather than the more liberal "reasonable possibility" test
used in Manning and Cage. See Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).
139. Manning, 305 S.C. at 416, 409 S.E.2d at 374 ("The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment 'safeguard[s] against dilution of the principle that guilt
is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.'"6)
(quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,486 (1978)); see also Cage v. Louisiana,
111 S. Ct. 328 (1990). But see State v. Johnson, 410 S.E.2d 547, 553-54 (S.C. 1991)
(refusing to reverse a capital murder conviction when the jury charge defined
reasonable doubt as "substantial doubt" because the judge did not include the term
"moral certainty"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1691 (1992).
140. Manning, 305 S.C. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 375.
141. Id. (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
142. 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).
143. Literally, "in favor of life." Id. at 60 n.9, 406 S.E.2d at 324 n.1 (Toal, J.
concurring).
144. Id. at 69, 406 S.E.2d at 328. In discarding infavorem vitae, the Torrence
court overruled ninety cases, the earliest being State v. Briggs, 3 S.C.L. 7, 1 Brev.
8 (1794). Torrence, 305 S.C. at 69 n.13, 406 S.E.2d at 328 n.5 (Toal, J.,
concurring).
145. 293 S.C. 294,360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2913 (1991),
and overruled by Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315.
19921
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a capital jury about a defendant's parole eligibility.' 46 These two
holdings, given in separate concurring opinions, deal a double blow to
capital defendants.
A. In Favorem Vitae
A jury convicted Michael R. Torrence of armed robbery, burglary,
and two murders and sentenced him to life imprisonment for one murder
and to death for the other. 147 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed
the convictions and life sentence, but reversed the death sentence.'
Justice Toa, concurring in the result of Torrence and joined by a
majority, pronounced the supreme court's abandonment of in favorem
vitae.149 The common-law doctrine of in favorem vitae provided
heightened scrutiny in capital cases by requiring the supreme court to
consider lower court errors when reviewing death penalty cases, even if
the defendant made no objections, motions, or requests.1' ° In all trials
beginning after Torrence, the supreme court will consider errors on
direct appellate review only if preserved by an objection or a mo-
tion. 1
5
Although the Torrence court conceded that in favorem vitae was
justified at a time when there were few procedural safeguards for
numerous capital offenses, the court concluded that the doctrine had
outlived its usefulness.' The court reasoned that the doctrine is no
longer necessary because murder is now the only capital crime and any
criminal defendant may file a direct appeal and apply for post-conviction
146. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 60, 406 S.E.2d at 323 (Chandler, J., concurring).
The court also held that a jury must determine the voluntariness of a defendant's
alleged confession that is initially introduced during the penalty phase. Id. at 52, 406
S.E.2d at 319.
147. Id. at 49, 406 S.E.2d at 317-18.
148. Id. at 54, 406 S.E.2d at 321.
149. Id. at 60, 406 S.E.2d at 324 (Toal, J., concurring). The court addressed the
question of whether to abolish infavorem vitae because one of Torrence's arguments
could be considered only via the doctrine. Id. at 60 n.10, 406 S.E.2d at 324 n.2. The
argument was not addressed in the main opinion.
150. Id. at 60-61, 406 S.E.2d at 324 (Toal, J. concurring). Infavorem vitae was
especially important in affording protection to convicted capital defendants
represented by inadequate counsel.
151. Id. at 69, 406 S.E.2d at 328.
152. Id. at 60-61, 406 S.E.2d at 324-25.
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relief (PCR).'53 Furthermore, federal habeas corpus relief is available
to criminal defendants, and South Carolina law mandates review of all
death penalty cases. 
1 54
The court also stated that the infavorem vitae doctrine presented the
danger that defense counsel in capital trials would engage in "sandbag-
ging.""' Sandbagging is a tactic whereby a defense attorney who feels
he is losing a capital case deliberately refrains from objecting to errors
at trial, knowing that the appellate court must review them anyway.
Defense attorneys might sandbag if they want the prosecution to commit
reversible error, or if they do not want to draw the jurors' attention to
erroneous evidence, arguments, or charges.'56 Additionally, some
attorneys may purposely refrain from objecting as a matter of trial
strategy, aware that on in favorem vitae review the court had no choice
but to assume ineffectiveness from the record.'
57
Torrence holds that it is preferable to deal with unpreserved errors
in PCR proceedings rather than through in favorem vitae review.'5 8
The court implied that only in adversarial proceedings such as PCR can
a tribunal make a "truly well-informed judgment" about the effectiveness
of counsel. '59 In favorem vitae also diluted the adversarial process by
forcing trial judges to perform defense counsel's job. No judge likes to
be reversed; yet if the trial judge did not assume a quasi-adversarial role
to prevent improprieties by the state to which defense counsel did not
object, reversal loomed certain under the doctrine. 1°0
Although the goals of upholding the adversarial system and relying
on procedural rules are noble, the furtherance of these goals at the
expense of infavorem vitae is questionable when the defendant's life is
at stake. Procedural safeguards that rely essentially on the adversarial
153. Id. at 62, 406 S.E.2d at 325. Most importantly, the Uniform Post-Convic-
tion Procedure Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976), provides relief
for applicants showing ineffective assistance of counsel. See Grier v. State, 299 S.C.
321, 323, 384 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1989) (per curiam).
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
155. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 65, 406 S.E.2d at 326 (Toal, J., concurring).
156. Id.
157. Id. However, the supreme court had held that infavorem vitae applied only
to errors of law, not strategy decisions. State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d
138 (1987), overruled by Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315. The Torrence
court noted that it was difficult to determine from the record whether the failure to
object was due to ineffective counsel or to legitimate strategy. Torrence, 305 S.C.
at 65 n.11, 406 S.E.2d at 326 n.3 (Toal, J., concurring).
158. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 66, 406 S.E.2d at 326.
159. Id. at 66, 406 S.E.2d at 326-27.
160. Id. at 66, 406 S.E.2d at 327.
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nature of the legal system are, by definition, only as effective as the
adversaries themselves. The premise of in favorem vitae is that the just
taking of a human life cannot necessarily be guaranteed by tie ad-
versarial process. Therefore, increased reliance on the adversarial
process cannot extinguish the need for the doctrine. Ineffective counsel
provides as little solace to a capital defendant at a PCR proceeding as it
does at trial.
1 61
Whether "sandbagging" or ineffectiveness of counsel is the
predominant cause of not objecting to errors remains unanswered. As
Justice Finney noted in his dissent to the majority's decision to abolish
in favorem vitae, the majority simply assumed bad faith on the part of
defense counsel. 62 Bad faith or not, "[i]t is incomprehensible that a
capital defendant should be penalized for the actions of his counsel when
the ultimate result may be prejudicial error for which a defendant pays
with his life."
1 63
A prosecutorial flip-side to "sandbagging" also exists. In the absence
of infavorem vitae, a solicitor facing ineffective defense counsel may be
tempted to do anything, proper or not, to convict a capital defendant.
Furthermore, dealing with errors in PCR proceedings instead of on direct
appellate review does not eliminate "sandbagging" because an unscrupu-
lous defense attorney could simply testify to his own "incompetence" at
the PCR hearing.
The Torrence court left open one possibility of relief for defendants
who have been "utterly failed" by the criminal justice system: a state
writ of habeas corpus."6 The abolition of in favorem vitae increases the
chances that a defendant will employ such a possibility.
B. Jury's Information on Parole Eligibility'6
At the time of his conviction in this case, Torrence was already
serving a life sentence for a previous unrelated murder conviction.
Before the penalty-phase closing arguments, Torrence's attorney
161. See Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448,409 S.E.2d 392 (1991) (holding that claim
of ineffective PCR counsel is not per se "sufficient reason" for allowing second PCR
application).
162. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 73, 406 S.E.2d at 330 (Finney, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 73, 406 S.E.2d at 331.
164. Id. at 69, 406 S.E.2d at 328 (Toal, J., concurring). A prisoner may obtain
a writ of habeas corpus from the South Carolina Supreme Court "after exhausting all
other sources of relief." Id.
165. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see James M. Hughes, Note,
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requested a charge that imposition of a life sentence would require
service without the possibility of parole, as mandated by section
24-21-640 of the South Carolina Code."6 The trial court refused to
give the charge, but told counsel that it would, upon request, give an
Atkins charge as to parole eligibility. 67 Torrence's defense counsel
requested the latter charge, which the court then gave.'68
On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the trial court
committed prejudicial error by refusing to charge the jury that Torrence,
if sentenced to life imprisonment, would be ineligible for parole.'69 The
supreme court held that denying the charge request was prejudicial
error. 7 Writing for the court, Justice Finney noted that the Atkins
charge was incorrect and stated that "[t]he requested charge was a
correct statement of law which would have provided the jury with
accurate information regarding appellant's parole eligibility."'
However, the remaining justices effectively overruled Atkins and
"reinstate[d] earlier precedent prohibiting capital sentencing juries from
being informed about parole."172
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that states are
free, in the interest of providing greater criminal justice system
protection, to prohibit juries from considering or being informed about
166. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 53, 406 S.E.2d at 320. Section 24-21-640 provides,
in pertinent part: "The Board [of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services] shall not
grant parole nor is parole authorized to any prisoner serving a sentence for a second
or subsequent conviction, following a separate sentencing for a prior conviction, for
violent crimes as defined in Section 16-1-60." S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law.
Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1991). Murder is a violent crime. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-60
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
167. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 54, 406 S.E.2d at 320. The court in State v. Atkins,
293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2913 (1991) and
overruled by Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315, authorized a trial court, upon
a capital defendant's request, to give one of two charges regarding possible sentences
and parole eligibility. The court could charge the sentencing jury that "the term 'life
imprisonment' is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning." Atkins, 293
S.C. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305. Or instead, the defendant could request the charge
that imposition of a life sentence would require service of at least twenty or thirty
years without the possibility of parole, depending on the absence or presence of
aggravating circumstances. Id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305-06. In South Carolina a
statute dictates parole possibilities for a murder conviction. S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-20(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1990).
168. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 53, 406 S.E.2d at 320.
169. Id. at 49, 406 S.E.2d at 318.
170. Id. at 54, 406 S.E.2d at 320.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 55, 406 S.E.2d at 321 (Chandler, J., concurring).
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parole possibilities.' 73 However, the court in Torrence cut back the
information available to sentencing juries. This conflicts with the
Supreme Court's statement in Gregg v. Georgia:'74
If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of
imposing sentences, has a vital need for accurate information... to
be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case,
then accurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite
to a reasoned determination of whether a defendant shall live or die
by a jury of people who may never before have made a sentencing
decision. 75
The South Carolina Supreme Court's overruling of Atkins clearly does
not provide greater protection for the defendant. Indeed, it reopens the




VIII. INDICTMENT ALLEGING OFFENSE OCCURRED SOMETIME
WITHIN A TWO-YEAR PERIOD NOT OVERLY BROAD
In State v. Wade" the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an
indictment alleging that a criminal offense occurred at some point within
a period of two years was neither overbroad nor unconstitutionally
vague.' This holding is consistent with previous South Carolina case
173. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
174. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
175. Id. at 190.
176. Consider two separate trials in which the defendants are convicted of
identical capital crimes. In each case the jury agrees that the defendant deserves thirty
years without the possibility of parole, as the statute mandates. However, each jury
will give a death sentence if it thinks there is any chance the defendant will serve less
than thirty years. Defense counsel requests a charge on parole eligibility, but is
denied under Torrence. Assume that Jury 1, by chance, knows the law regarding
parole eligibility, but Jury 2 labors under the misconception that a "lifer" may be out
in seven or eight years. Under this hypothetical, Jury 2 would return a death
sentence, even though it believes the defendant deserves only thirty years; Jury 1,
under the same facts, would impose life with the possibility of parole.
177. 306 S.C. 79, 409 S.E.2d 780 (1991).
178. Id. at 80, 409 S.E.2d at 781. The South Carolina Code provides:
Every indictment shall be deemed and judged sufficient and good in
law which, in addition to allegations as to time and place, as required by
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law179 and with a majority of jurisdictions that have considered similar
cases.1
80
The victim accused her uncle, John Wade, of touching her in the
vaginal area while they were alone in her grandparents' bedroom. The
indictment charged that the defendant "'did... at divers times during
1984 through 1985, wilfully and unlawfully commit a sexual battery
upon [the victim], a minor of less than eleven (11) years of age.'"
18'
The jury found Wade guilty, and the court sentenced him to thirty years
in prison. Wade appealed."
In affirming the lower court's decision, the supreme court rejected
the defendant's contention that the two-year time period made it
impossible to defend against the accusation."' The court first estab-
lished that an indictment is adequate if it states the offense "'with
sufficient certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what
judgment to pronounce, the defendant to know what he is called upon to
answer, and acquittal or conviction to be placed in bar to any subsequent
prosecution. '"" 4 Additionally, the court explained that appellate courts
law, charges the crime substantially in the language of the common law
or of the statute prohibiting the crime or so plainly that the nature of the
offense charged may be easily understood and, if the offense be a statutory
offense, that the offense be alleged to be contrary to the statute in such
case made and provided.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-19-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added).
179. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496,501,409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that an indictment which failed to identify correctly the exact
location of the incident and which charged that the offense occurred "'on or about
December 9, 1988'" was "sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the law").
180. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
181. Wade, 306 S.C. at 80, 409 S.E.2d at 781 (quoting indictment).
182. Id. at 81, 409 S.E.2d at 781.
183. Id. at 81-82, 409 S.E.2d at 781-82. The court interpreted Wade's appeal as
requesting "a per se rule that a two year indictment period is unconstitutionally
overbroad." Id. at.82 & n.3, 409 S.E.2d at 781-82 & n.3. However, Justice Finney,
in his dissent, did not agree that Wade'sought a per se rule. Justice Finney believed
Wade asserted "that under the circumstances of this case, the two-year period of time
is overbroad in that it created a situation which prejudiced his defense and denied him
a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 87, 409 S.E.2d at 784 (Finney, J., dissenting).
Justice Finney found the indictment inadequate because it failed "to state the offense
with sufficient certainty and particularity to enable him to defend himself against the
charges." Id. at 88, 409 S.E.2d at 785.
184. Id. at 82, 409 S.E.2d at 782 (quoting State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 125,
283 S.E.2d 582, 587 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305
S.C. 45,406 S.E.2d 315 (1991), and limited by State v. Davis, No. 23727, 1992 WL
266861 (S.C. Oct. 5, 1992)). In Adams the defendant argued that an indictment for
housebreaking which alleged that he "'did ... break and enter the house ... with
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28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
must review an indictment using a practical, case-by-case approach
instead of a per se rule of invalidity based on an inflexible time
limit. " The Wade court concluded that under the circumstances of this
case, the indictment was as specific as possible.86
The court declared that it is necessary to include in the indictment
the precise time of the offense only when "time enters into the nature of
the offense, or is made part of the description of it."187 Additionally,
the court observed that it had previously upheld an indictment that failed
intent to commit a crime therein'" was fatally defective because it failed to allege the
specific crime intended. Adams, 277 S.C. at 124-25, 283 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting
indictment). The supreme court denied Adams's appeal because the court found "no
indication that the appellant was unfairly prejudiced since he obviously knew the
crimes for which he was being tried." Id. at 125-26, 283 S.E.2d at 588.
The Wade court noted that the test for the sufficiency of an indictment is "'not
whether it could have been more definite and certain, but whether it contains the
necessary elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently apprises the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.'" Wade, 306 S.C. at 83, 409 S.E.2d
at 782 (quoting State v. Ham, 259 S.C. 118, 129, 191 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1972)).
185. Wade, 306 S.C. at 83, 409 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Adams, 277 S.C. at 115,
283 S.E.2d at 582); see also State v. Dell'Orfano, 592 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (rejecting a per se rule for an information charging that an offense
occurred within a two-and-one-half-year period).
186. Wade, 306 S.C. at 84, 409 S.E.2d at 783. The court noted that Wade's
defense of denial and his attempt to prove factual impossibility "severely weakened"
his claim that the lengthy indictment period prejudiced his defense. Id. at 84-85, 409
S.E.2d at 783. Additionally, the court rejected Wade's argument that the vagueness
of the indictment made proving an alibi defense impossible. Id. at 85, 409 S.E.2d at
783. The court explained that "[t]he jury could have determined that this young child
had little concept of dates and time. Indeed, at trial the victim testified that she did
not know her own age." Id. at 84, 409 S.E.2d at 783.
187. Id. at 85, 409 S.E.2d at 783 (citing State v. Peak, 134 S.C. 329, 340, 133
S.E. 31, 34 (1926)); accord State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 409 S.E.2d 420 (Ct.
App. 1991). The Thompson court stated that the absence of a specific date is fatal to
an indictment only when the date is a "material element of the offense." Id. at 500,
409 S.E.2d at 423. In first-degree criminal sexual conduct cases, the specific date and
time are not elements of the offense. Id. at 501, 409 S.E.2d at 423 (citing State v.
Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 324 (Ct. App. 1991)).
The Thompson court also addressed the failure of an indictment to identify
correctly the location of an alleged offense. The court concluded that an indictment
is adequate if it alleges the location sufficiently enough to establish the jurisdiction
of the court and to inform the accused of the county in which the charge against him
is pending. Id. at 500, 409 S.E.2d at 423 (citing State v. McIntire, 221 S.C. 504,
510, 71 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1952)); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-19-20 (Law. Co-
op. 1976) (stating allegations necessary for a valid indictment).
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to state the specific date of the alleged offense."'8 In cases such as
Wade, when the defendant raises an alibi defense, the court requires
"only that the State must 'not be allowed to prove a different date than
that set forth in the indictment. . . unless the defendant is held to have
had knowledge that the State would attempt to prove a different date
upon trial.'" 1"9
The Wade majority also questioned the dissent's application of the
Adams case-by-case test."9 The dissent evaluated the "surrounding
circumstances" and "prejudice" regarding the evidence the state
presented at trial instead of in the context defined by the Adams
court. 91 The Adams test requires that the pre-trial circumstances
determine whether the indictment prejudiced the defendant."9
Numerous jurisdictions that have examined indictment requirements
agree that under limited circumstances, the requirements may be liberally
construed.193 The most prevalent explanation for this view is that,when
188. Wade, 306 S.C. at 85, 409 S.E.2d at 784 (citing State v. Shoemaker, 276
S.C. 86, 275 S.E.2d 878 (1981)). The majority criticized the dissent for ignoring
modem case law, and for relying instead on the nineteenth century case of State v.
Brown, 24 S.C. 224 (1886), for the proposition that an indictment's "failure to allege
specific time and place [is] fatal." Wade, 306 S.C. at 85, 409 S.E.2d at 783.
189. Wade, 306 S.C. at 85,409 S.E.2d at 784 (quoting State v. Pierce, 263 S.C.
23, 27, 207 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1974)). The Wade court explained that the Pierce
ruling could not be "construed to require a more specific time allegation in an
indictment for an alibi defendant, when no such specificity is possible due to, e.g.,
the prosecutrix being a child." Id. at 86, 409 S.E.2d at 784.
190. For a discussion of the Adams test, see supra note 184. p.
191. Wade, 306 S.C. at 86, 409 S.E.2d at 784. The majority explained that the
dissent's approach "looks ahead to the evidence presented at trial" and makes it
impossible to evaluate the "surrounding circumstances" and "prejudice" in a pretrial
motion. Id.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., State v. Dell'Orfano, 592 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding information that charged sexual battery to a child occurred during a two-
and-cine-half-year period); Johnson v. State, 402 S.E.2d 115 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding indictment that alleged child molestation occurred during a three-year
period); State v. Everett, 399 S.E.2d 305 (N.C. 1991) (upholding indictment that
charged rape and first-degree sexual offense occurred during three-month period);
State v. Hill, 570 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct. App.) (per curiam) (upholding indictment
that alleged rape of a thirteen-year-old girl occurred on an unknown date in
December 1986), cert. dismissed, 537 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio 1989); State v. Byrd, 820
S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1991) (upholding presentment that charged offenses against
minors occurred on undetermined dates within a twenty-five-month period).
Decisions that have liberally construed indictments are not limited to child
molestation cases. See, e.g., Lightboume v. State, 438 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1983) (first-
degree murder), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984); Chesser v. State, 283 S.E.2d
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time is not a material element of the alleged offense, one need not allege
the time with particularity." 9 Other courts have found an indictment
sufficient if the alleged time falls within the relevant statute of limitations
and prior to the issuance of the indictment. 95 A few jurisdictions use
a "reasonableness test," consisting of a number of factors for evaluating
an indictment. 1
96
Despite the sometimes compelling reasons for allowing nonspecific
accusatory pleadings, courts must maintain the integrity of the indictment
process. The Wade opinion advocates a "case-by-case" approach for
judging an indictment's sufficiency, but fails to specify what factors are
particularly relevant.191 The dissent noted this failure by stating:
Other courts, using a case by case analysis, have articulated factors
which should be considered in determining whether or not an
indictment is overbroad in its time parameters. Without such a case
by case analysis ... the majority is endorsing, carte blanche, a two-
24 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (theft); Commonwealth v. Gray, 374 A.2d 1285 (Pa. 1977)
(voluntary manslaughter).
194. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500,409 S.E.2d 420,423 (Ct.
App. 1991); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct. App.
1991); State v. Ross, 568 A.2d 335, 337 (Vt. 1989).
195. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 588 So. 2d 551, 559 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 588 So. 2d 551 (Ala. 1991); State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 227, 4 S.E.2d
1, 7 (1939); State v. Shaw, 82 S.W. 480, 480 (Tenn. 1904). This reasoning is often
used in conjunction with the material-element test. See, e.g., Wingo, 304 S.C. at 175,
403 S.E.2d at 323.
196. See e.g., People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (N.Y. 1984) ("The
standard is that of reasonableness; '[r]easonable certainty, all will agree, is required
in criminal pleading.'") (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 568
(1875)). Although the factors vary by jurisdiction, the most common factors include:
the length of the alleged period of time in relation to the number of
individual criminal acts alleged; the passage of time between the alleged
period for the crime and the defendant's arrest; the duration between the
date of the indictment and the alleged offense; and the ability of the victim
or complaining witness to particularize the date and time of the alleged
transaction or offense.
Id. at 1260; see also In re K.A.W., 515 A.2d 1217 (N.J. 1986). The New Jersey
Supreme Court suggested several factors in addition to those listed in Morris: "the
age and intelligence of the victim, the extent and thoroughness of the prosecutor's
investigative efforts to narrow the time frame of the alleged offense, and whether
there was a continuous course of conduct." Id. at 1222; accord State v. Fawcett, 426
N.W.2d 91 (Wis. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 428 N.W.2d 553 (Wis. 1988).
197. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44
31
Boyd et al.: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
CRIMINAL LAW
year indictment period as being permissible. This sets a dangerous
precedent.'9"
Although the dissent may have overstated the problem, the suggestion
that the Adams test should be expanded is meritorious. 9 The supreme
court should take the next available opportunity to provide a list of
factors for trial courts to consider when determining the sufficiency of
an indictment.
In reaching its decision the Wade court recognized that requiring all
indictments to satisfy strict technical requirements would be impossible
and unwise. Although place and time indictments serve a critical
purpose, broad indictments, such as that in the instant case, are necessary
under certain circumstances. The approach adopted by the supreme court
in Wade provides a reasonable solution to a difficult problem.
Wendy Hallford-Dudley
IX. COCAINE RESIDUE MAY SUPPORT CONVICTION FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION
In State v. Robinson2 ° the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that possession of a measurable quantity of cocaine is necessary to sustain
a conviction for illegal possession, but that possession can be proved
circumstantially by seizure of trace amounts. 2°1 The court declined to
adopt the majority approach that possession of an identifiable residue of
contraband is sufficient to support a conviction for possession.' The
Robinson court interpreted prior decisions of the South Carolina Supreme
Court regarding the requirements of possession as inconsistent with the
majority view. 3
A jury convicted Roland Rod Robinson of possession -of cocaine. At
trial the State'prbduced testimony that on April 15, 1989, police officers
198. State v. Wade, 306 S.C. 79, 88 n.1, 409 S.E.2d 780, 785 n.1 (1991)
(Finney, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
199. See Fawcett, 426 N.W.2d at 94 (concluding that factors under the
"reasonableness test" can assist in determining the sufficiency of a two-factor test).
200. 411 S.E.2d 678 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991), cert. granted, No. 1726 (S.C. June
16, 1992).
201. Id. at 680.
202. For a discussion of the majority approach, see infra text accompanying notes
207 and 221.
203. See Robinson, 411 S.E.2d at 680-81. The court's interpretation is discussed
infra note 211 and accompanying text.
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went to Winyah Grill, a place known for drug activity. When the officers
entered the premises, Robinson was standing next to a man named
Evans, who was rolling a marijuana cigarette. Upon seeing the officers,
Robinson yelled, "'the heat is in the house.'" 2 4 The officers searched
Evans and found several vials of cocaine. One officer observed Robinson
throwing something into a trash can. A search of the trash can revealed
a cocaine smoking pipe and a plastic vial that contained a residue amount
of cocaine which was neither weighable nor otherwise measurable. 5
On appeal, Robinson contended that the trial judge committed
reversible error by refusing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal.
Robinson argued that the State did not present sufficient proof that he
possessed a measurable amount of cocaine, as contemplated by South
Carolina statute.2
The court acknowledged that, although the South Carolina Supreme
Court has never addressed this particular question, a majority of
jurisdictions have held that possession of an identifiable residue of a
contraband drug is sufficient to support a conviction for possession. 20,
However, as the Robinson court noted, the supreme court has held that
possession of any amount of contraband will support a conviction for the
related offense of possession with intent to distribute if sufficient
evidence of intent to distribute exists."' The Robinson court also
observed that simple possession of contraband requires both the power
and the intent to control the disposition or use of the contraband.0 9
204. Robinson, 411 S.E.2d at 679.
205. Id.
206. Id. The controlling South Carolina statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to
possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly
from, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order of, a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise
authorized by this article.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
207. Robinson, 411 S.E.2d at 679-80 (citing Robbs v. Commonwealth, 176
S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1970); State v. Dodd, 137 N.W.2d 465 (Wis. 1965); Partain v.
State, 228 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), aft'd, 232 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 1977); State
v. Thomas, 201 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 202 S.E.2d 277
(N.C. 1974)).
208. Id. at 680 (citing State v. Goldsmith, 301 S.C. 463, 392 S.E.2d 787 (1990);
Matthews v. State, 300 S.C. 238, 387 S.E.2d 258 (1990); State v. Adams, 291 S.C.
132, 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987)).
209. Id. (citing State v. Kimbrell, 294 S.C. 51, 362 S.E.2d 630 (1987); State v.
Ellis, 263 S.C. 12, 207 S.E.2d 408 (1974)).
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The court of appeals initially had no difficulty applying the majority
rule to the South Carolina possession statute.210 Nevertheless, the court
agreed with Robinson's argument that, under the supreme court's "power
and intent to control distribution or use"' requirement for possession, one
cannot have power or control over something that one cannot measure or
see. 211
However, the court of appeals affirmed Robinson's conviction. The
court held that, although less than a usable amount of a drug will support
a conviction for possession, only a measurable amount of a drug is
capable of disposition or use.2" The court further concluded that
"illegal possession may be demonstrated if the facts and circumstances
of the case can be seen to demonstrate that the quantity of drug actually
seized was a remnant of a larger measurable amount the defendant
possessed in the past. "213 Essentially, the new rule is that if the court
can infer that the accused possessed a measurable quantity of drugs in the
past, based on an unmeasurable trace and the facts and circumstances of
the case, then the accused is guilty of possession of that measurable
amount.
The Robinson court relied on a concurring opinion in the Georgia
Court of Appeals case of Partain v. State.214 The defendant in Partain
challenged his cocaine possession conviction, arguing that residue on
scale pans was an insufficient amount to convict him.215 The Partain
210. Id. "Our statute makes it illegal for a person to 'knowingly or intentionally'
possess cocaine. The statute specifies no minimum amount. Thus, at least on the face
of the statute there is no impediment to an application of the majority rule." Id.
(citation omitted).
211. Id. The court stated:
Under our Supreme Court's formulation of the criteria for possession, it
cannot be gainsaid [sic] that one could have the power and intent to
control the disposition or use of an amount of a drug if the amount is
incapable of measure or as is the case here, the amount is invisible to the
naked eye.
Id. (footnote omitted). Given the context of this statement, the court seems to have
misused the word "gainsaid," which means "denied," but may have intended
"maintained" or a synonym thereof. In a footnote the court found additional support
for Robinson's argument in the wording of the indictment, which stated that Robinson
was found to possess a "quantity" of cocaine. Id. at 680 n.2.
212. Id. at 680. Possession of a measurable amount of a drug may be shown by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.
213. Id. (citing Partain v. State, 228 S.E.2d 292, 294-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)
(Pannell, J., concurring), aff'd, 232 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 1977)).
214. 228 S.E.2d 292, 294-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (Pannell, J., concurring),
aff'd, 232 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 1977), cited in Robinson, 411 S.E.2d at 680.
215. Id. at 293.
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court adopted the majority view on the issue and held that any identifi-
able amount, however small, together with other evidence of possession,
will support a conviction.216 The concurrence in Partain advocated the
adoption of a "compromise between the minority and majority views,"
whereby illegal possession is established if, when viewing the facts and
circumstances of a case, "'it can be reasonably inferred that the quantity
of narcotic actually discovered is but a remnant of a larger, usable
amount.' "217
The Partain concurrence followed the reasoning of a Michigan
Court of Appeals decision that had already been overruled when Partain
was decided. In People v. Harrington2 8 the Michigan Supreme Court
rejected the "remnant of a usable amount" test and adopted an "any
amount visible to the naked eye" test for possession.219 The Harrington
court discussed the merits and problems of the three different tests used
to establish the amount of contraband necessary to support a possession
conviction. 220
THE ANY AMOUNT TEST. The majority rule is that possession
of any identifiable amount of a contraband drug will support a conviction
for illegal possession. 2 A common criticism of this test is that it may
result in convictions of individuals who may have unknowingly possessed
trace amounts. 22 But, as the Harrington court pointed out, knowledge
of the presence of the contraband drug is generally an essential element
of possession.'
216. Id. at 294.
217. Id. at 295 (Pannell, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Harrington, 190
N.W.2d 343, 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971), overruled, 238 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. 1976)).
218. 238 N.W.2d 20 (Mich. 1976) (3-2 decision) (Kavanagh, C.J., and Levin,
J., dissenting), overruling People v. Harrington, 190 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971).
219. Id. at 27.
220. Id. at 23-27.
221. Id. at 23.
222. Id. at 24"(citation omitted).
223. Id. In South Carolina a statute makes explicit this element by requiring a
person to possess "knowingly or intentionally" a controlled substance in order to be
convicted of unlawful possession. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-370(c) (Law. Co-op.
1976).
Nevertheless, a literal application of the "any amount" test, even coupled with
a knowledge or intent requirement, could result in the conviction of innocent
individuals. Ostensibly, people realize that some paper currency is tainted with
ummeasurable yet identifiable traces of cocaine. Establishing that individuals had this
knowledge about the currency in their possession and that they intentionally possessed
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THE USABLE AMOUNT TEST. The "usable amount" test, similar
to the South Carolina Supreme Court's "power and intent to control"
test, requires possession of a usable amount for conviction. Two basic
arguments are given for this test. The first argument, similar to the
argument given by the appellant in Robinson, is that the knowledge
requirement cannot be met if the amount is "so small that its presence
can be detected only through chemical or other scientific analysis."'
The second argument is that the test more accurately interprets the
legislative intent of reducing illegal drug use because "quantities too
small to be used do not pose the sort of societal danger contemplat-
ed.",'2
The major problem with the "usable amount" rule is that it is more
difficult to administer than the "any amount" rule.' No court has
precisely defined "usable amount." Perhaps more importantly, determi-
nation of a usable amount in any particular case may require testimony
concerning a defendant's habit, possibly violating the constitutional
prohibition against making drug addiction a criminal offense.37
THE REMNANT OF A USABLE AMOUNT TEST. The "remnant"
test was offered "to facilitate efficient law enforcement without undue
encroachment on individual rights. "I The problem with this test, as
noted by the Harrington court, is that it makes the "possession of the
hide . . . possession of the horse" 9 inference dependent upon the
circumstances, with the attendant risk that illegal possession of drugs
may become essentially a status offense."o
The Robinson court offered no rationale for applying the "remnant"
test. However, the court invited the supreme court to grant certiorari
because the Robinson court's interpretation of supreme court precedent
was inconsistent with the majority view."3 The supreme court may
agree to decide which test best interprets the legislature's intent in
making possession of contraband drugs illegal. If so, the court will have
224. Harrington, 238 N.W.2d at 25 (footnote omitted).
225. Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 26 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding
unconstitutional a state law making "status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense)).
However, a similar argument can be made against the knowledge requirement of the
"any amount" test. Establishing knowledge or intent may invite consideration of
exactly the same sorts of issues.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 28 (Kavanagh, C.J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 26.
231. State v. Robinson, 411 S.E.2d 678, 680-81 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991), cert.
granted, No. 1726 (S.C. June 16, 1992).
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to determine whether the test's ease of administration outweighs the
consequences of convicting individuals for possession of invisible,
unmeasurable, and unusable traces of contraband drugs.
James M. Hughes
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